Facts about Firefighter Maydays – What Every Fire Officer and Firefighter Needs to Know

By Dean Guccione - February 10, 2019                                           Photo by Daniel Jasina

Whether you’re a firefighter, engineer, company officer, or chief officer, the thought of a Mayday occurring on an incident is terrifying at the very least, and the last thing you want to happen is to find yourself in a situation where you need to call for a Mayday. And, as the incident commander, the last thing you want is to have to manage a Mayday.

If you are preparing for your Company Officer Assessment Center exam, these statistics and factors will help you prepare when you're not only asked to manage the initial phase of an incident, but when you're asked to describe, in detail, your considerations and actions when assigned as the RIC/RIT Group Supervisor.

I’m hoping that the factors and statistics listed in this article will help you, as a firefighter, company officer, or chief officer, to understand why, when, and how Maydays occur, by showing you some of the more common factors leading up a Mayday call.

Factors such as loss of situational awareness, loss of time orientation, disorientation, attempting to fix the problem before calling for help, pride, and denial are all contributing factors to Mayday incidents. 

I recently read an article on Firehouse.com, written by Chief Billy Goldfelder, a Firehouse contributor, and co-host of www.firefighterclosecalls.com, who discussed the data from Don Abbott and his team, who are devoted experts in the study of firefighter Maydays. Don is an expert on Mayday statistics and factors, who started an organization called Project Mayday (projectmayday.net). His sole purpose is to learn why, when, and how Maydays occur, so we can learn from those who’ve experienced a Mayday and recognize the factors that lead up to the fireground call for help. You may or may not be surprised at the resulting factors.

The following are the statistics Chief Goldfelder pulled from the Project Mayday report, but I also added several more common statistics and factors that lead to Mayday calls. The point of all of these factors and statistics is that fire departments must not only have SOPs in place to help prevent a Mayday from occurring, but members of all ranks must train, practice and work together to prevent a Mayday occurrence. That includes properly maintaining and checking your portable radio, SCBA, facepiece and regulator on a daily basis, and participating in regular training and coordination on what each company’s role and function is when a Mayday is called, which includes incident management, communications, RIC/RIT team operations, additional companies added to RIC/RIT, and self-rescue.

The statistics from Project Mayday came from 4219 radio transmissions and 679 dash-cam videos, confirming almost all of their data, along with tactical worksheets, dispatch logs, SOPs, Mayday training information, follow up reports and internal investigation documents.

Additionally, the statistics presented are believed to be only about 8% to 10% of Maydays that actually occur annually in the fire service and interestingly enough, over half of all Maydays occurred between midnight and 0600 hours.

Trigger phrases

Chief Goldfelder reported in Firehouse.com that after listening to more than 5,000 audio recordings—repeated numerous times by a group of firefighters and fire officers—and transmitted over the fireground audio tapes, Abbott and his team identified 16 communication phrases that were heard more than 87 percent of the time in Mayday incidents. In other words, if you hear one of these phrases, it should get everyone's attention, and a combination of these phrases should alert the incident commander (IC) that a Mayday may be inevitable:

• “We have zero-visibility conditions” – 59 percent occurrence
• “We have fire above our heads” – 81 percent occurrence
• “We have fire below us” – 56 percent occurrence
• “We need more line to reach the fire; extend our line” – 36 percent occurrence
• “We have not found the seat of the fire” – 67 percent occurrence
• “We are running out of air” (low-air alarm in background) – 73 percent occurrence
• “This is a hoarder house” – 54 percent occurrence
• “We have had a flashover” – 37 percent occurrence
• “We have had a ceiling/roof collapse” – 37 percent occurrence
• “We have lost multiple windows” – 29 percent occurrence
• “It’s really getting hot in here, we are backing out” – 44 percent occurrence
• “Our exit has been blocked” – 21 percent occurrence
• “We are sending a firefighter out with a problem” – 19 percent occurrence
• “We have a hole in the floor/or floor collapse” – 56 percent occurrence
• “Command has lost communications with multiple crews” – 19 percent
• “We have a lot of sprinkler heads going off in here” – 54 percent occurrence (commercial structure/rack storage)

These phrases are critical to identifying a problem, often before it happens. Chief Goldfelder goes on to say that one of the most significant factors Project Mayday found is that 37 percent of all Mayday victims did not transmit the Mayday when they should have.

For additional details about the trigger phrases, read Abbott’s feature “Communication Clues” at firehouse.com/12387578.

Personnel involved

Many chiefs interviewed stated that they could have predicted the crew having the mayday based on the number of crewmembers with “move-ups (acting upwards in a position),” working out of assignment, and overtime/staffing issues. In other words, being outside the crew that normally worked together.

Crewmember having Maydays

• Move-up company officer (normally a firefighter or engineer, but filling in as officer) – 13 percent
• Move-up engineer (normally a firefighter, but filling in as an engineer) – 25 percent
• Firefighter working overtime – 31 percent
• Crew running short on staffing – 32 percent

What training and qualifications do your personnel have when working “out of position”? How often does your drivers/engineers train as part of a firefighting crew?

Crew size

The size of the crew calling the Mayday was represented in the Project Mayday studies as follows:

• 2-person crew – 27 percent
• 3-person crew – 39 percent
• 4-person crew – 34 percent 

Communication and radios

According to Project Mayday, 36 percent of Maydays transmitted were missed on the first call by anyone on the fireground or dispatch. The majority of missed maydays were called on portable radios, and most radios were not fully charged. Further, it was determined that only 53 percent of the agencies actually followed their communications-related standard operating procedures (SOPs)/department policies during the actual mayday event.

Some other communications-related findings from the Project Mayday studies:

• Radio emergency activation (EA) buttons were activated in only 32 percent of all maydays
• 74 percent of mayday victims did not completely understand how their radio’s EA button system worked and what functions/problems this may create
• 61 percent of fire departments change channels for a mayday 

Considering the number of missed Mayday calls, it’s important that communications be as clear as possible, with specific phrasing. For example, instead of saying “Engine 16” (said as sixteen), say “Engine one-six,” and instead of saying “A side,” say “Alpha side.” Some additional tips:

• Keep radio cables from portable to lapel mic inside the coat or covered with a sleeve
• Clean lapel mics regularly
• Portable radios should be hard-charged at least every 48 hours
• Portable radio batteries should be replaced every 3 years
• All radios should be set up so that if you turn the channel selector all the way right or left, it is on the same channel

Consider these questions: What is your department’s mayday policy related to the above factors, including daily radio maintenance and checks, channels used, radio control, dispatch involvement, responsibility of the non-Mayday companies on the fireground, radio discipline, and command managing that Mayday? Do you train and therefore operate based upon your written policies, or are your policies one thing but how you operate on the fireground another thing? Does your department have a battery-management tracking system?

Mayday callers report

The experience of the Mayday callers themselves cannot go unrecognized. Firefighters who called maydays reported the following:

• Command offered reassurance/instructions – 63 percent
• Frustration due to too much radio traffic – 47 percent
• Not turning on/off PASS unit or muffling it, making communications difficult – 57 percent
• Confidence in the IC (93 percent); company officer (84 percent) and rapid-intervention crew/team (RIC/RIT, 20 percent) 

Additionally, Mayday-callers reported an inability to get radio air time after transmitting the mayday. The studies also showed an average time of approximately 79 seconds from the mayday transmission to the point the call was answered or acknowledged. 

Radio discipline is a big deal. Many departments have adopted the policy of “no good news” on the radio. In other words, there is no need to advise anyone if you have water on the fire; after all, that's what you were told to do. On the other hand, if you are not making progress and things are getting worse, that is a valid transmission. As we have shared in this column before, a good term to remember is DIM-WIT: “Does It Matter What I'm Transmitting?” If not, don't transmit. 

Further, can your dispatchers monitor and transmit on the fireground channels throughout the entire incident? Are there policies related to what the dispatchers are expected to do on those channels? When training, are your dispatchers training with you, on the radio, as they would operate in a real emergency?  

Mayday causes and survival

Firefighters involved in Maydays reported the following contributing factors to their mayday:

• Situational awareness – 77 percent
• Disorientation – 65 percent
• Decision-making – 64 percent
• Individual actions – 71 percent
• Communications – 36 percent
• Not enough resources – 39 percent
• Unsafe acts – 65 percent

Firefighters involved in Maydays reporting the following methods for how they survived the incident:

• Self-rescue – 36 percent
• Assisted by their own crew – 26 percent
• Assisted by another interior crew – 25 percent
• RIT rescue – 7 percent
• Other – 6 percent 

Although RIC/RIT affected a rescue in only 7 percent of mayday incidents studied, their presence at the scene is important, as it provides a dedicated team to respond if teams already in the structure are unable to assist. In the cases studied:

• RIC/RIT had been established prior to the IC’s arrival – 15 percent
• IC established a RIC/RIT – 89 percent
• When first RIC/RIT was activated, second RIC/RIT was immediately established – 18 percent

A key finding from Project Mayday: One out of every eight RIC/RITs that is put to work to conduct a rescue has their own Mayday. It was determined that in many cases, the RIC/RIT went in too quickly without understanding the entire situation, most often because the IC did not define the actual problem prior to RIC/RIT’s entry.

Are all firefighters who respond to your fires fully qualified to be rapid intervention? What policy identifies who can serve in a RIC/RIT function? The RIC/RIT should be your best crew on the scene. Nobody wants to depend on crewmembers who are out of shape, have poor training habits, are not familiar with the RIC/RIT equipment, are not properly trained to use the RIC/RIT equipment, or are just lazy.

Command issues

Strong and effective command is vital in mayday situations. Following are Project Mayday findings related to the experience level of those in positions of command during mayday events:

• Average years of service – 16.7 years
• Average years of IC experience – 6.6 years
• Initial training time ICs receive related to running an incident – 4 hours
• Continued in-service training annually for IC – 3 hours

Following are general findings related to incident command at mayday events:

• Average response time for a chief to arrive on scene and assume command – 6 minutes, 39 seconds
• Responding chief could hear all radio traffic while responding – 76 percent
• Tactical priorities were established and announced by first-arriving unit – 64 percent
• IC operated alone in command vehicle without an aid – 77 percent
• IC reviewed or evaluated their incident action plan during the incident prior to the mayday – 67 percent
• IC used a formal tactical worksheet – 64 percent
• Tactical benchmarks were transmitted during the fire – 73 percent (face to face: 22 percent; radio: 82 percent)
• Safety officer assigned for each incident – 22 percent
• Automatic aid or mutual aid in use at the time of the mayday – 46 percent
• IC served as a mutual-aid chief handling a mayday – 24 percent
• No accountability management in operation at the time of the mayday – 68 percent

Additionally, Project Mayday found a nearly three-way split among the command options on scene:

• IC ran both command and mayday rescue operations – 38 percent
• IC ran the fire but was able to pass the rescue to another officer – 29 percent
• IC ran mayday rescue and passed fire operations – 35 percent

Some questions to consider: What is your area or regional policy for the initial and ongoing training to develop qualifications for an IC? How often are those who may someday be in command re-trained or re-certified as a fire commander? Is everyone from the chief of department to the newest company officer trained and qualified, at least annually in a classroom as well as during hands-on training programs, in addition to their field firefighting experience?

Additional Factors and Statistics

• On all incidents that had a Mayday incident, 61 percent of first in officers failed to complete a 360 of the building, when assuming command.
• One out of 8 RIC/RIT team members calls a Mayday for themselves.
• 93%bof successful rescues comes from within the building.
• Based on research from Project Mayday, 2 in/2 out does not work and is completely ineffective due to lack of planning by the 2 out crew, poorly trained 2 out crew, to few people, not mentally prepared, and not properly dressed. This is most interesting since 2 in/2 out is mandated by OSHA in all states and OSHA at the federal level.
• Majority of Maydays occur with first arriving engine company.
• 61% of Maydays occurred with enough resources on scene.
• It took an average of almost 90 seconds before a Mayday was responded to.
• 42.5% of Maydays occurred in the last 12 hours of a 48 hour shift.
• 77.5% of Maydays occurred in the last 12 hours of a 24 hour shift.
• 88% of all Maydays occurred on incidents where the fire department works 24 hour shifts.
• The majority of all Maydays occurred with only the first alarm companies on scene.
• 81% of Maydays occurred because the firefighter thought they had enough air to exit.
• 83% of Maydays occurred because the firefighter thought that because the other members had air, they were okay.

After the mayday

Learning from emergency incidents is vital to reducing future occurrences. Project Mayday found the following related to actions after a mayday incident:

• Scene debriefing – 74 percent
• On-site critique – 52 percent
• Investigation into mayday/incident – 34 percent
• Policies reviewed – 74 percent
• Policies changed – 36 percent
• Training changed – 56 percent  

Final thoughts

Here we’ve covered the latest findings related to what actually happened during Mayday incidents. Some issues that still need further research specific to firefighter survival include the impact of several additional factors:

• Sleep 
• Energy drinks
• Fitness
• Behavioral health 
• Training specific to flow path

Abbott and his team continue to gather more data from those who have been in Mayday scenarios and those who were in command at the time. It is incumbent upon all of us to use this information at our own departments, so we learn from what our brothers and sisters have already experienced, so we can not only be effective in the performance of our job, but also to return home safely at the end of the shift to those we love.